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likewise barred the "last clear chance" doctrine as a possible
ground of recovery. The court holds, however, that "An implied
licensee upon the tracks of a railroad company who plainly exceeds
the purpose for which the license has been allowed by the owner
becomes a trespasser." 9 The rule that a licensee who exceeds
his license becomes a trespasser is well settled.10 However, this
seems to be the first time the West Virginia court has applied it
to facts such as appear in the present case. Other courts have made
a similar application of the rule, the Texas court saying: "If the
public had a license to use the tracks as a highway, no license can
be inferred to use the tracks for sleeping purposes.''"
I

PRINciPA

SUE PRINmAL

Aim SuRETY -

D. V. B3.

DISCHARGE OF SURETY -

NOTICE TO

SUFFICmNcY OF NOTICE. - S signed, as surety,

a note held by C. A statute provided that after a cause of action
had accrued, "The surety... may. . . require the creditor... by
notice in writing, forthwith to institute suit",' and if the creditor
does not institute suit within a reasonable time after notice, the
surety shall be released.' S sent C the following notice: "... . this
is to notify you to collect his note on which I am endorser . . ."I
Five years later, C brought suit on the note, and S claimed release
under the statute. Held, one judge dissenting, that the notice was
insufficient under the statute. Williams v. Zimmerman.'
Several courts have held a notice "to collect" sufficient under
this type of statute,5 but the majority opinion discounted these
holdings as based either on special urgency expressed in the notice,
or on the special working of the statute itself. At the other ex9 Syllabus by the court.

10 Cornett's Adm1r v. Louisville & W. R. R., 181 Ky. 132, 203 S. W. 1054
(1918); Lyons' Adm1r v. Illinois Central R. R., 22 Ky. L. R. 1032, 59 S. W.
507 (1900); Smith v. International & G. N. R., 34 Tex. Civ. App. 209, 78 S. W.

556 (190).
21.1bid.
IW. VA. CODE (Miehie, 1937) c. 45, art. 1, § 1.
2 d at § 2.
3Williams v. Zimmerman, 20 S. E. (2d) 785, 786 (W. Va. 1942). Italics ours.
4 20 S. B. (2d) 785 (W. Va. 1942).
' Franklin v. Franklin, 71 Ind. 573 (1880); liff v. Weymouth, 40 Ohio St.
101 (1883); Strickler v. Burkholder, 47 Pa. 476 (1864); Sullivan v. Dwyer, 42
S. W. 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897). Cf. Benge's Adm'r v. Eversole, 156 Ky. 131,
160 S. W. 911 (1913) and Baker v. Whittaker, 177 Ky. 197, 197 S. W. 644
(1917).
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treme, it has been held that a notice "to sue" was not sufficient, because it omitted the requirement "forthwith".6 The weight of
authority is in accord with the view of the instant case, that notice
"to collect" is not substantial compliance with the statute.7 The
supreme court of Virginia has held that a notice by a surety to take
whatever steps are necessary to get his name off the obligation was
not sufficient under an identical statute." In a leading case on the
point, it was said that "the notice must contain the following essentials, to wit: (1) It must be peremptory. It must 'require' the
(2) 'Commencement of an action'; (3) 'Forthwith'; (4) It must
be unconditional, and (5) It must not be misleading, but should be
easily understood."' The notice in the instant case lacked urgency,
was not a peremptory demand, and did not directly require the commencement of an action.
The trial court, in a written opinion,1 adopted a strict construction of the statute, while the supreme court of appeals acknowledged itself committed to a liberal interpretation of the statute, and
yet both agreed that only substantial compliance with the terms of
the statute was required by the law of the state. The dissenting
judge was of the opinion that under the liberal interpretation, the
notice in the instant case was substantial compliance. The rationale
of the deqisions which are in accord with the West Virginia court
on this point is that before this statute was passed, the only relief
of a surety from an indolent creditor was by a bill quia timet," and
that since the statute provides a way by which the surety may be released from a valid contract obligation, and the creditor be made to
forfeit his rights against the surety, it is not unreasonable to require

G
OMc illin v. Deardorff, 18 Ind. App. 428, 48 N. B. 233 (1897).
7 Darby v. Berney National Bank, 97 Ala. 643, 11 So. 881 (1892); Frye v.
Eisenbiess, 56 Ind. App. 123, 104 N. E. 995 (1914); Hunt v. Purdy, 82 N. Y.
486 (1880); 30 A. L. R. 1292.
8 Edmonson v. Potts' Adm'r, 111 Va. 79, 68 S. E. 254 (1910). The tenor
of the notice required is, "an explicit and peremptory demand", Naylor v.
Anderson, 178 S. W. 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); "a positive direction to
sue", Bowling v. Chambers, 20 Colo. App. 113, 122, 77 Pac. 16 (1904); "must
show a clear, unequivocal and distinct demand", Edmonson v. Potts' Admir,
111 Va. 79, 82, 68 S. E. 254 (1910).
0 Frye v. Eisenbiess, 56 Ind. App. 123, 126, 104 N. E. 995 (1914), quoting
from Haskell v. Beers, 16 Ohio Dec. 368, 371 (1906).
E0Williams v. Zimmerman, Record, p. 19.
11 In Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174 (N. Y. 1816), without the aid of a
statute, a surety was released when the creditor did not sue the principal after
notice by the creditor. This result was criticized as a common law result in
AaPAT, SunurYsHiP & GUARANTY (1931) 316.
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strict compliance with the statute." The surety must leave no possible
doubt in the mind of the creditor that he is standing on his
statutory right, and that unless suit is commenced within a reasonable time, he will claim release under the statute." The notice is
so simple that even a layman could easily comply therewith and
there is no reason why the statute should not be strictly followed.
This is not a case in which abstract justice is either for or
against the decision, but, as is often true in the field of commercial
law, the certainty of a rule is its principal virtue. By this holding
the rule is made certain and the scope of possible future litigation
greatly limited. It is now settled in this state that a notice "to
collect" is not sufficient. The safe thing to do when drafting such
a notice, as usually is true, is to follow the exact wording of the
statute: "I require you forthwith to institute suit."
D. C. H.
STATES -

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS -

LOAN OF CREDIT.-

Mandamus to compel the county court of Webster county to transfer from the general county fund to the general relief fund the
balance of the amount included in the budget for general relief.
The county court, in compliance with the general welfare law had
represented to the state tax commissioner that it would provide a
separate item for general relief in its budget, to be not less than
fifteen percent of the total amount which the county court might
levy for current expenses as authorized by law. This sum was to
supplement the funds spent by the state in the county for general
relief. The county court contended that the public welfare law'
violated that section of the state constitution which provides that
"The credit of the State shall not be granted to, or in aid of any
county, city, township, corporation, or person; nor shall the State
ever assume or become responsible for the debts or liabilities of
any county, city, township, corporation or person.' ' Held, that
this was not a loan of credit within the meaning of the constitution,
but was only county participation in a state function.'
'Mcfillin v. Deardoff, 18 Ind. App. 428, 429, 48 N. E. 233 (1897);
Maier v. Canavan, 57 How. Pr. 504, 507 (N. Y. 1879); Edmonson v. Potts'
Adm'r, 111 Va. 79, 82, 86 S. E. 254 (1910).
13 Denick v. Hubbard, 27 Hun 347, 351 (N. Y. 1882).
1 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 9, art. 10, as amended by W. Va. Acts 1941,
c. 74.
2 W. VA. CONST. art, X, § 6.
3Kenny v. County Court of Webster County, 21 S. E. (2d) 385 (W. Va.

1942).
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